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Abstract
Solomonoff’s inductive learning model is a powerful, universal and
highly elegant theory of sequence prediction. Its critical flaw is that it
is incomputable and thus cannot be used in practice. It is sometimes
suggested that it may still be useful to help guide the development of
very general and powerful theories of prediction which are computable.
In this paper it is shown that although powerful algorithms exist, they
are necessarily highly complex. This alone makes their theoretical analy-
sis problematic, however it is further shown that beyond a moderate level
of complexity the analysis runs into the deeper problem of Go¨del incom-
pleteness. This limits the power of mathematics to analyse and study
prediction algorithms, and indeed intelligent systems in general.
1 Introduction
Could there exist an elegant and universal theory of sequence prediction?
Solomonoff’s model of induction rapidly learns to make optimal predictions
for any computable sequence, including probabilistic ones [13, 14]. Indeed the
problem of sequence prediction could well be considered solved [9, 8], if it were
not for the fact that Solomonoff’s theoretical model is incomputable.
Among computable theories there exist powerful general predictors, such as
the Lempel-Ziv algorithm [5] and Context Tree Weighting [18], that can learn to
predict some complex sequences, but not others. Some prediction methods, such
as the Minimum Description Length principle [12] and the Minimum Message
Length principle [17], can even be viewed as computable approximations to
Solomonoff induction [10]. However in practice their power and generality are
limited by the power of compression and coding methods employed, as well
as having a significantly reduced data efficiency as compared to Solomonoff
induction [11].
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Could there exist elegant computable prediction algorithms that are in some
sense universal, or at least universal over large sets of simple sequences? In this
paper we explore this fundamental question from the perspective of Kolmogorov
complexity theory and uncover some surprising implications.
2 Preliminaries
An alphabet A is a finite set of 2 or more elements which are called symbols. In
this paper we will assume a binary alphabet B := {0, 1}, though all the results
can easily be generalised to other alphabets. A string is a finite ordered n-tuple
of symbols denoted x := x1x2 . . . xn where ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xi ∈ B, or more
succinctly, x ∈ Bn. The 0-tuple is denoted λ and is called the null string. The
expression B≤n has the obvious interpretation, and B∗ :=
⋃
n∈N B
n. The length
lexicographical ordering is a total order on B∗ defined as λ < 0 < 1 < 00 < 01 <
10 < 11 < 000 < 001 < · · ·. A substring of x is defined xj:k := xjxj+1 . . . xk
where 1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ n. By |x| we mean the length of the string x, for example,
|xj:k| = k − j + 1. We will sometimes need to encode a natural number as a
string. Using simple encoding techniques it can be shown that there exists a
computable injective function f : N→ B∗ where no string in the range of f is a
prefix of any other, and ∀n ∈ N : |f(n)| ≤ log2 n+ 2 log2 log2 n+ 1.
Unlike strings which always have finite length, a sequence ω is an infinite
list of symbols x1x2x3 . . . ∈ B
∞. Of particular interest to us will be the class
of sequences which can be generated by an algorithm executed on a universal
Turing machine:
2.1 Definition. A monotone universal Turing machine U is defined as a
universal Turing machine with one unidirectional input tape, one unidirectional
output tape, and some bidirectional work tapes. Input tapes are read only,
output tapes are write only, unidirectional tapes are those where the head can
only move from left to right. All tapes are binary (no blank symbol) and the
work tapes are initially filled with zeros. We say that U outputs/computes a
sequence ω on input p, and write U(p) = ω, if U reads all of p but no more as
it continues to write ω to the output tape.
We fix U and define U(p, x) by simply using a standard coding technique to
encode a program p along with a string x ∈ B∗ as a single input string for U .
2.2 Definition. A sequence ω ∈ B∞ is a computable binary sequence if
there exists a program q ∈ B∗ that writes ω to a one-way output tape when run
on a monotone universal Turing machine U , that is, ∃q ∈ B∗ : U(q) = ω. We
denote the set of all computable sequences by C.
A similar definition for strings is not necessary as all strings have finite length
and are therefore trivially computable.
2.3 Definition. A computable binary predictor is a program p ∈ B∗ that
on a universal Turing machine U computes a total function B∗ → B.
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For simplicity of notation we will often write p(x) to mean the function
computed by the program p when executed on U along with the input string x,
that is, p(x) is short hand for U(p, x). Having x1:n as input, the objective of a
predictor is for its output, called its prediction, to match the next symbol in the
sequence. Formally we express this by writing p(x1:n) = xn+1.
As the algorithmic prediction of incomputable sequences, such as the halting
sequence, is impossible by definition, we only consider the problem of predicting
computable sequences. To simplify things we will assume that the predictor has
an unlimited supply of computation time and storage. We will also make the
assumption that the predictor has unlimited data to learn from, that is, we
are only concerned with whether or not a predictor can learn to predict in the
following sense:
2.4 Definition. We say that a predictor p can learn to predict a sequence
ω := x1x2 . . . ∈ B∞ if there exists m ∈ N such that ∀n ≥ m : p(x1:n) = xn+1.
The existence of m in the above definition need not be constructive, that is,
we might not know when the predictor will stop making prediction errors for
a given sequence, just that this will occur eventually. This is essentially “next
value” prediction as characterised by Barzdin [1], which follows from Gold’s
notion of identifiability in the limit for languages [7].
2.5 Definition. Let P (ω) be the set of all predictors able to learn to predict
ω. Similarly for sets of sequences S ⊂ B∞, define P (S) :=
⋂
ω∈S P (ω).
A standard measure of complexity for sequences is the length of the shortest
program which generates the sequence:
2.6 Definition. For any sequence ω ∈ B∞ the monotone Kolmogorov
complexity of the sequence is,
K(ω) := min
q∈B∗
{|q| : U(q) = ω},
where U is a monotone universal Turing machine. If no such q exists, we define
K(ω) :=∞.
It can be shown that this measure of complexity depends on our choice
of universal Turing machine U , but only up to an additive constant that is
independent of ω. This is due to the fact that a universal Turing machine can
simulate any other universal Turing machine with a fixed length program.
In essentially the same way as the definition above we can define the Kol-
mogorov complexity of a string x ∈ Bn, written K(x), by requiring that U(q)
halts after generating x on the output tape. For an extensive treatment of
Kolmogorov complexity and some of its applications see [10] or [2].
As many of our results will have the above property of holding within an
additive constant that is independent of the variables in the expression, we will
indicate this by placing a small plus above the equality or inequality symbol.
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For example, f(x) <
+
g(x) means that that ∃c ∈ R, ∀x : f(x) < g(x) + c. When
using standard “Big O” notation this is unnecessary as expressions are already
understood to hold within an independent constant, however for consistency of
notation we will use it in these cases also.
3 Prediction of computable sequences
The most elementary result is that every computable sequence can be predicted
by at least one predictor, and that this predictor need not be significantly more
complex than the sequence to be predicted.
3.1 Lemma. ∀ω ∈ C, ∃p ∈ P (ω) : K(p) <
+
K(ω).
Proof. As the sequence ω is computable, there must exist at least one
algorithm that generates ω. Let q be the shortest such algorithm and construct
an algorithm p that “predicts” ω as follows: Firstly the algorithm p reads x1:n
to find the value of n, then it runs q to generate x1:n+1 and returns xn+1 as
its prediction. Clearly p perfectly predicts ω and |p| < |q| + c, for some small
constant c that is independent of ω and q. ✷
Not only can any computable sequence be predicted, there also exist very
simple predictors able to predict arbitrarily complex sequences:
3.2 Lemma. There exist a predictor p such that ∀n ∈ N, ∃ω ∈ C : p ∈ P (ω)
and K(ω) > n.
Proof. Take a string x such that K(x) = |x| ≥ 2n, and from this define a
sequence ω := x0000 . . .. Clearly K(ω) > n and yet a simple predictor p that
always predicts 0 can learn to predict ω. ✷
The predictor used in the above proof is very simple and can only learn
sequences that end with all 0’s, albeit where the initial string can have an
arbitrarily high Kolmogorov complexity. It is not hard to see that more sophis-
ticated predictors can learn to predict many other more subtle types of patterns
which are more complex than the predictor, such as arbitrary repeating strings,
regular or primitive recursive sequences.
As each computable sequence can be predicted, and simple predictors exist
which can predict arbitrarily complex sequences, we might wonder whether there
exists a computable predictor able to learn to predict all computable sequences.
Unfortunately, no universal predictor exists, indeed for every predictor there
exists a sequence which it cannot predict at all:
3.3 Lemma. For any predictor p there constructively exists a sequence ω :=
x1x2 . . . ∈ C such that ∀n ∈ N : p(x1:n) 6= xn+1 and K(ω) <
+
K(p).
Proof. For any computable predictor p there constructively exists a com-
putable sequence ω = x1x2x3 . . . computed by an algorithm q defined as follows:
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Set x1 = 1−p(λ), then x2 = 1−p(x1), then x3 = 1−p(x1:2) and so on. Clearly
ω ∈ C and ∀n ∈ N : p(x1:n) = 1− xn+1.
Let p∗ be the shortest program that computes the same function as p and
define a sequence generation algorithm q∗ based on p∗ using the procedure above.
By construction, |q∗| = |p∗| + c for some constant c that is independent of p∗.
Because q∗ generates ω, it follows that K(ω) ≤ |q∗|. By definition K(p) = |p∗|
and so K(ω) <
+
K(p). ✷
Allowing the predictor to be probabilistic does not fundamentally avoid the
problem of Lemma 3.3. In each step, rather than generating the opposite to what
will be predicted by p, instead q attempts to generate the symbol which p is least
likely to predict given x1:n. To do this q must simulate p in order to estimate
Pr
(
p(x1:n) = 1
∣
∣x1:n
)
. With sufficient simulation effort, q can estimate this
probability to any desired accuracy for any x1:n. This produces a computable
sequence ω such that ∀n ∈ N : Pr
(
p(x1:n) = xn+1
∣
∣x1:n
)
is not significantly
greater than 1
2
, that is, the performance of p is no better than a predictor that
makes completely random predictions.
The impossibility of prediction in this more general probabilistic setting has
been pointed out before by Dawid [4]. Specifically, Dawid notes that for any sta-
tistical forecasting system there exist sequences which are not calibrated. Dawid
also notes that a forecasting system for a family of distributions is necessarily
more complex than any forecasting system generated from a single distribution
in the family. However, he does not deal with the complexity of the sequences
themselves, nor does he make a precise statement in terms of a specific measure
of complexity, such as Kolmogorov complexity. The impossibility of forecast-
ing has since been developed in considerably more depth by V’yugin [16], in
particular, it is proven that there is an efficient randomised procedure produc-
ing sequences that cannot be predicted (with high probability) by computable
forecasting systems.
As probabilistic prediction complicates things without avoiding this funda-
mental problem, in the remainder of this paper we will consider only determinis-
tic predictors. This will also allow us to see the roots of this problem as clearly
as possible. With the preliminaries covered, we now move on to the central
problem considered in this paper: Predicting sequences of limited Kolmogorov
complexity.
4 Prediction of simple computable sequences
As the computable prediction of any computable sequence is impossible, a
weaker goal is to be able to predict all “simple” computable sequences.
4.1 Definition. For n ∈ N, let Cn := {ω ∈ C : K(ω) ≤ n}. Further, let
Pn := P (Cn) be the set of predictors able to learn to predict all sequences in Cn.
Firstly we establish that prediction algorithms exist that can learn to predict
all sequences up to a given complexity, and that these predictors need not be
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significantly more complex than the sequences they can predict:
4.2 Lemma. ∀n ∈ N, ∃p ∈ Pn : K(p) <
+
n+O(log2 n).
Proof. Let h ∈ N be the number of programs of length n or less which
generate infinite sequences. Build the value of h into a prediction algorithm p
constructed as follows:
In the kth prediction cycle run in parallel all programs of length n or less
until h of these programs have each produced k + 1 symbols of output. Next
predict according to the k + 1th symbol of the generated string whose first k
symbols is consistent with the observed string. If two generated strings are
consistent with the observed sequence (there cannot be more than two as the
strings are binary and have length k+ 1), pick the one which was generated by
the program that occurs first in a lexicographical ordering of the programs. If
no generated output is consistent, give up and output a fixed symbol.
For sufficiently large k, only the h programs which produce infinite sequences
will produce output strings of length k. As this set of sequences is finite, they
can be uniquely identified by finite initial strings. Thus for sufficiently large
k the predictor p will correctly predict any computable sequence ω for which
K(ω) ≤ n, that is, p ∈ Pn.
As there are 2n+1− 1 possible strings of length n or less, h < 2n+1 and thus
we can encode h with log2 h + 2 log2 log2 h = n+ 1 + 2 log2(n + 1) bits. Thus,
K(p) < n+ 1 + 2 log2(n+ 1) + c for some constant c that is independent of n.
✷
Can we do better than this? Lemma 3.2 shows us that there exist predictors
able to predict at least some sequences vastly more complex than themselves.
This suggests that there might exist simple predictors able to predict arbitrary
sequences up to a high complexity. Formally, could there exist p ∈ Pn where
n≫ K(p)? Unfortunately, these simple but powerful predictors are not possible:
4.3 Theorem. ∀n ∈ N : p ∈ Pn ⇒ K(p) >
+
n.
Proof. For any n ∈ N let p ∈ Pn, that is, ∀ω ∈ Cn : p ∈ P (ω). By Lemma 3.3
we know that ∃ω′ ∈ C : p /∈ P (ω′) . As p /∈ P (ω′) it must be the case that
ω′ /∈ Cn, that is, K(ω
′) ≥ n. From Lemma 3.3 we also know that K(p) >
+
K(ω′)
and so the result follows. ✷
Intuitively the reason for this is as follows: Lemma 3.3 guarantees that
every simple predictor fails for at least one simple sequence. Thus if we want
a predictor that can learn to predict all sequences up to a moderate level of
complexity, then clearly the predictor cannot be simple. Likewise, if we want a
predictor that can predict all sequences up to a high level of complexity, then
the predictor itself must be very complex. Thus, even though we have made the
generous assumption of unlimited computational resources and data to learn
from, only very complex algorithms can be truly powerful predictors.
6
These results easily generalise to notions of complexity that take computa-
tion time into consideration. As sequences are infinite, the appropriate measure
of time is the time needed to generate or predict the next symbol in the se-
quence. Under any reasonable measure of time complexity, the operation of
inverting a single output from a binary valued function can be performed with
little cost. If C is any complexity measure with this property, it is trivial to
see that the proof of Lemma 3.3 still holds for C. From this, an analogue of
Theorem 4.3 for C easily follows. With similar arguments these results also gen-
eralise in a straightforward way to complexity measures that take space or other
computational resources into account. Thus, the fact that extremely powerful
predictors must be very complex, holds under any measure of complexity for
which inverting a single bit is inexpensive.
5 Complexity of prediction
Another way of viewing these results is in terms of an alternate notion of se-
quence complexity defined as the size of the smallest predictor able to learn
to predict the sequence. This allows us to express the results of the previous
sections more concisely. Formally, for any sequence ω define the complexity
measure,
K˙(ω) := min
p∈B∗
{|p| : p ∈ P (ω)},
and K˙(ω) := ∞ if P (ω) = ∅. Thus, if K˙(ω) is high then the sequence ω is
complex in the sense that only complex prediction algorithms are able to learn
to predict it. It can easily be seen that this notion of complexity has the same
invariance to the choice of reference universal Turing machine as the standard
Kolmogorov complexity measure.
It may be tempting to conjecture that this definition simply describes what
might be called the “tail end complexity” of a sequence, that is, K˙(ω) =
limi→∞K(ωi:∞). This is not the case. Consider again Lemma 3.2 and its
proof. For any n ∈ N, we let y1:n be a random string, that is, K(y1:n)
+
= n.
From this we defined a computable sequence that was a repetition of this string,
ω := (y1:n)
∗. It was then proven that there exists a single predictor p which
can predict any sequence of this form, with no restriction on how high K(ω)
can be. From our definition of K˙ above it is thus clear that K˙(ω)
+
= 0 for any
such ω. Consider now the tail complexity of ω. As K(y1:n)
+
= n, whenever
i mod n = 0 we have K(ωi:∞) >
+
n − O(log n) (the O(log n) term comes from
potentially saving bits due to not having to encode |y1:n|). Thus even if the
limit limi→∞K(ωi:∞) exists (it may oscillate), it cannot be equal to K˙(ω) in
general.
Using K˙ we can now rewrite a number of our previous results more succinctly
in terms of the new complexity measure. From Lemma 3.1 it immediately follows
that,
∀ω : 0 ≤ K˙(ω) <
+
K(ω).
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From Lemma 3.2 we know that ∃c ∈ N, ∀n ∈ N, ∃ω ∈ C such that K˙(ω) < c
and K(ω) > n, that is, K˙ can attain the lower bound above within a small
constant, no matter how large the value of K is. The sequences for which the
upper bound on K˙ is tight are interesting as they are the ones which demand
complex predictors. We prove the existence of these sequences and look at some
of their properties in the next section.
The complexity measure K˙ can also be generalised to sets of sequences, for
S ⊂ B∞ define K˙(S) := minp{|p| : p ∈ P (S)}. This allows us to rewrite
Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 as simply,
∀n ∈ N : n <
+
K˙(Cn) <
+
n+O(log2 n).
This is just a restatement of the fact that the simplest predictor capable of
predicting all sequences up to a Kolmogorov complexity of n, has itself a Kol-
mogorov complexity of roughly n.
6 Hard to predict sequences
We have already seen that some individual sequences, such as the repeating
string used in the proof of Lemma 3.2, can have arbitrarily high Kolmogorov
complexity but nevertheless can be predicted by trivial algorithms. Thus, al-
though these sequences contain a lot of information in the Kolmogorov sense,
in a deeper sense their structure is very simple and easily learnt.
What interests us in this section is the other extreme; individual sequences
which can only be predicted by complex predictors. As we are only concerned
with prediction in the limit, this extra complexity in the predictor must be some
kind of special information which cannot be learnt just through observing the
sequence. Our first task is to show that these difficult to predict sequences exist.
6.1 Theorem. ∀n ∈ N, ∃ω ∈ C : n <
+
K˙(ω) <
+
K(ω) <
+
n+O(log2 n).
Proof. For any n ∈ N, let Qn ⊂ B<n be the set of programs shorter than
n that are predictors, and let x1:k ∈ Bk be the observed initial string from the
sequence ω which is to be predicted. Now construct a meta-predictor pˆ:
By dovetailing the computations, run in parallel every program of length
less than n on every string in B≤k. Each time a program is found to halt on
all of these input strings, add the program to a set of “candidate prediction
algorithms”, called Q˜kn. As each element of Qn is a valid predictor and thus will
halt for all input strings for any k, for every n and k it eventually will be the case
that |Q˜kn| = |Qn|. At this point the simulation to approximate Qn terminates.
It is clear that for sufficiently large values of k all of the valid predictors, and
only the valid predictors, will halt with a single symbol of output on all tested
input strings. That is, ∃r ∈ N, ∀k > r : Q˜kn = Qn.
The second part of the pˆ algorithm uses these candidate prediction algo-
rithms to make a prediction. For p ∈ Q˜kn define d
k(p) :=
∑k−1
i=1 |p(x1:i)− xi+1|.
Informally, dk(p) is the number of prediction errors made by p so far. Compute
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this for all p ∈ Q˜kn and then let p
∗
k ∈ Q˜
k
n be the program with minimal d
k(p).
If there is more than one such program, break the tie by letting p∗k be the lexi-
cographically first of these. Finally, pˆ computes the value of p∗k(x1:k) and then
returns this as its prediction and halts.
By Lemma 3.3, there exists ω′ ∈ C such that pˆ makes a prediction error
for every k when trying to predict ω′. Thus, in each cycle at least one of
the finitely many predictors with minimal dk makes a prediction error and so
∀p ∈ Qn : d
k(p) → ∞ as k → ∞. Therefore, ∄p ∈ Qn : p ∈ P (ω′), that is,
no program of length less than n can learn to predict ω′ and so n ≤ K˙(ω′).
Further, from Lemma 3.1 we know that K˙(ω′) <
+
K(ω′), and from Lemma 3.3
again, K(ω′) <
+
K(pˆ).
Examining the algorithm for pˆ, we see that it contains some fixed length
program code and an encoding of |Qn|, where |Qn| < 2
n − 1. Thus, using a
standard encoding method for integers, K(pˆ) <
+
n+O(log2 n).
Chaining these together we get, n <
+
K˙(ω′) <
+
K(ω′) <
+
K(pˆ) <
+
n+O(log2 n),
which proves the theorem. ✷
This establishes the existence of sequences with arbitrarily high K˙ complex-
ity which also have a similar level of Kolmogorov complexity. Next we establish
a fundamental property of high K˙ complexity sequences: they are extremely
difficult to compute.
For an algorithm q that generates ω ∈ C, define tq(n) to be the number of
computation steps performed by q before the nth symbol of ω is written to the
output tape. For example, if q is a simple algorithm that outputs the sequence
010101 . . ., then clearly tq(n) = O(n) and so ω can be computed quickly. The
following theorem proves that if a sequence can be computed in a reasonable
amount of time, then the sequence must have a low K˙ complexity:
6.2 Lemma. ∀ω ∈ C, if ∃q : U(q) = ω and ∃r ∈ N, ∀n > r : tq(n) < 2n, then
K˙(ω)
+
= 0.
Proof. Construct a prediction algorithm p˜ as follows:
On input x1:n, run all programs of length n or less, each for 2
n+1 steps. In
a set Wn collect together all generated strings which are at least n+ 1 symbols
long and where the first n symbols match the observed string x1:n. Now order
the strings in Wn according to a lexicographical ordering of their generating
programs. If Wn = ∅, then just return a prediction of 1 and halt. If |Wn| > 1
then return the n+ 1th symbol from the first sequence in the above ordering.
Assume that ∃q : U(q) = ω such that ∃r ∈ N, ∀n > r : tq(n) < 2n. If q
is not unique, take q to be the lexicographically first of these. Clearly ∀n > r
the initial string from ω generated by q will be in the set Wn. As there is no
lexicographically lower program which can generate ω within the time constraint
tq(n) < 2
n for all n > r, for sufficiently large n the predictor p˜ must converge on
using q for each prediction and thus p˜ ∈ P (ω). As |p˜| is clearly a fixed constant
that is independent of ω, it follows then that K˙(ω) < |p˜|
+
= 0. ✷
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We could replace the 2n bound in the above result with an even more rapidly
growing computable function, for example, 22
n
. In any case, this does not
change the fundamental result that sequences which have a high K˙ complexity
are practically impossible to compute. However from our theoretical perspec-
tive these sequences present no problem as they can be predicted, albeit with
immense difficulty.
7 The limits of mathematical analysis
One way to interpret the results of the previous sections is in terms of construc-
tive theories of prediction. Essentially, a constructive theory of prediction T ,
expressed in some sufficiently rich formal system F , is in effect a description of
a prediction algorithm with respect to a universal Turing machine which imple-
ments the required parts of F . Thus from Theorems 4.3 and 6.1 it follows that if
we want to have a predictor that can learn to predict all sequences up to a high
level of Kolmogorov complexity, or even just predict individual sequences which
have high K˙ complexity, the constructive theory of prediction that we base our
predictor on must be very complex. Elegant and highly general constructive
theories of prediction simply do not exist, even if we assume unlimited compu-
tational resources. This is in marked contrast to Solomonoff’s highly elegant
but non-constructive theory of prediction.
Naturally, highly complex theories of prediction will be very difficult to
mathematically analyse, if not practically impossible. Thus at some point the
development of very general prediction algorithms must become mainly an ex-
perimental endeavour due to the difficulty of working with the required theory.
Interestingly, an even stronger result can be proven showing that beyond some
point the mathematical analysis is in fact impossible, even in theory:
7.1 Theorem. In any consistent formal axiomatic system F that is sufficiently
rich to express statements of the form “p ∈ Pn”, there exists m ∈ N such that
for all n > m and for all predictors p ∈ Pn the true statement “p ∈ Pn” cannot
be proven in F .
In other words, even though we have proven that very powerful sequence
prediction algorithms exist, beyond a certain complexity it is impossible to find
any of these algorithms using mathematics. The proof has a similar structure
to Chaitin’s information theoretic proof [3] of Go¨del incompleteness theorem for
formal axiomatic systems [6].
Proof. For each n ∈ N let Tn be the set of statements expressed in the formal
system F of the form “p ∈ Pn”, where p is filled in with the complete description
of some algorithm in each case. As the set of programs is denumerable, Tn is
also denumerable and each element of Tn has finite length. From Lemma 4.2
and Theorem 4.3 it follows that each Tn contains infinitely many statements of
the form “p ∈ Pn” which are true.
Fix n and create a search algorithm s that enumerates all proofs in the
formal system F searching for a proof of a statement in the set Tn. As the set
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Tn is recursive, s can always recognise a proof of a statement in Tn. If s finds
any such proof, it outputs the corresponding program p and then halts.
By way of contradiction, assume that s halts, that is, a proof of a theorem
in Tn is found and p such that p ∈ Pn is generated as output. The size of
the algorithm s is a constant (a description of the formal system F and some
proof enumeration code) as well as an O(log2 n) term needed to describe n. It
follows then that K(p) <
+
O(log2 n). However from Theorem 4.3 we know that
K(p) >
+
n. Thus, for sufficiently large n, we have a contradiction and so our
assumption of the existence of a proof must be false. That is, for sufficiently
large n and for all p ∈ Pn, the true statement “p ∈ Pn” cannot be proven within
the formal system F . ✷
The exact value of m depends on our choice of formal system F and which
reference machine U we measure complexity with respect to. However for rea-
sonable choices of F and U the value of m would be in the order of 1000. That
is, the bound m is certainly not so large as to be vacuous.
8 Discussion
Solomonoff induction is an elegant and extremely general model of inductive
learning. It neatly brings together the philosophical principles of Occam’s razor,
Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations, Bayes theorem and Turing’s model
of universal computation into a theoretical sequence predictor with astonishingly
powerful properties. If theoretical models of prediction can have such elegance
and power, one cannot help but wonder whether similarly beautiful and highly
general computable theories of prediction are also possible.
What we have shown here is that there does not exist an elegant constructive
theory of prediction for computable sequences, even if we assume unbounded
computational resources, unbounded data and learning time, and place mod-
erate bounds on the Kolmogorov complexity of the sequences to be predicted.
Very powerful computable predictors are therefore necessarily complex. We
have further shown that the source of this problem is computable sequences
which are extremely expensive to compute. While we have proven that very
powerful prediction algorithms which can learn to predict these sequences exist,
we have also proven that, unfortunately, mathematical analysis cannot be used
to discover these algorithms due to problems of Go¨del incompleteness.
These results can be extended to more general settings, specifically to those
problems which are equivalent to, or depend on, sequence prediction. Consider,
for example, a reinforcement learning agent interacting with an environment
[15, 8]. In each interaction cycle the agent must choose its actions so as to max-
imise the future rewards that it receives from the environment. Of course the
agent cannot know for certain whether or not some action will lead to rewards
in the future, thus it must predict these. Clearly, at the heart of reinforcement
learning lies a prediction problem, and so the results for computable predic-
tors presented in this paper also apply to computable reinforcement learners.
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More specifically, from Theorem 4.3 it follows that very powerful computable
reinforcement learners are necessarily complex, and from Theorem 7.1 it fol-
lows that it is impossible to discover extremely powerful reinforcement learning
algorithms mathematically.
It is reasonable to ask whether the assumptions we have made in our model
need to be changed. If we increase the power of the predictors further, for
example by providing them with some kind of an oracle, this would make the
predictors even more unrealistic than they currently are. Clearly this goes
against our goal of finding an elegant, powerful and general prediction theory
that is more realistic in its assumptions than Solomonoff’s incomputable model.
On the other hand, if we weaken our assumptions about the predictors’ resources
to make them more realistic, we are in effect taking a subset of our current class
of predictors. As such, all the same limitations and problems will still apply, as
well as some new ones.
It seems then that the way forward is to further restrict the problem space.
One possibility would be to bound the amount of computation time needed
to generate the next symbol in the sequence. However if we do this without
restricting the predictors’ resources then the simple predictor from Lemma 6.2
easily learns to predict any such sequence and thus the problem of prediction in
the limit has become trivial. Another possibility might be to bound the memory
of the machine used to generate the sequence, however this makes the generator
a finite state machine and thus bounds its computation time, again making the
problem trivial.
Perhaps the only reasonable solution would be to add additional restrictions
to both the algorithms which generate the sequences to be predicted, and to the
predictors. We may also want to consider not just learnability in the limit, but
also how quickly the predictor is able to learn. Of course we are then facing a
much more difficult analysis problem.
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